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Abstract
We construct an algorithm that makes it possible to numerically obtain an investor’s
optimal portfolio under general preferences. In particular, the objective function and
risks constraints may be driven by benchmarks (reflecting state-dependent preferences).
We apply the algorithm to various classic optimal portfolio problems for which ex-
plicit solutions are available and show that our numerical solutions are compatible
with them. This observation allows us to conclude that the algorithm can be trusted as
a viable way to deal with portfolio optimization problems for which explicit solutions
are not in reach.
Key-words: optimal portfolio, algorithm, law-invariant, GOP, cost-efficiency, state-dependent
preferences.
1 Introduction
The quest for truly quantitative approaches to optimal portfolios was effectively initiated
by Markowitz (1952). It is known that his mean-variance optimization framework, which
balances return and risk (measured by mean and variance, respectively), provides the
same solutions as those obtained when maximizing the expected utility of the portfolio
using a quadratic utility function (Expected Utility Theory (EUT)). Although it is not rea-
sonable to expect investors have all to adhere to using quadratic utility, Levy & Markowitz
(1979), Markowitz (1952) and Markowitz et al. (2000) have all asserted that the theoretical
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gap between expected utility maximization and mean-variance analysis is not significant
in practice.
Nonetheless, studies by Allais (1953), Edwards (1955, 1962) and Machina (1987, 1995,
2004) have contributed to a growing body of evidence that individuals do not necessarily
conform to the key assumptions or predictions of expected utility models. This has led to
the development of alternative decision theories that seek to accommodate systematic de-
partures from the expected utility model while retaining as much of its analytical power as
possible. Other paradigms that have been proposed in the literature include Yaari’s Dual
Theory (Yaari 1987), Lopes’ SP/A Theory (Lopes 1987, Lopes & Oden 1999, Shefrin & Stat-
man 2000), Quiggin’s Rank Dependent Utility Theory (Quiggin 1993) and the Cumulative
Prospect Theory of Kahneman & Tversky (Tversky & Kahneman 1992). Although these
competing theories differ significantly from each other, they have a common ground in
that the wealth level is evaluated using an increasing law-invariant objective.1 Specifically,
the investor does not care about the particular states of the economy in which the outcomes
of a payoff are received; he or she cares only about the distribution of this payoff.
Dybvig (1988) introduced an alternative method for portfolio selection. Rather than
optimizing an increasing law-invariant objective for a given budget (primal problem), Dy-
bvig minimized the budget necessary to obtain a desired distribution of terminal wealth
(dual problem). He showed that in order to generate a given distribution at minimum cost,
the payoff must be decreasing in the state-price process; see also Bernard et al. (2014a) and
Carlier & Dana (2011). It is thus optimal for investors to consume more in cheaper states,
which reflect economic abundance, than in the more expensive ones, which reflect eco-
nomic recession. Clearly, solutions to the primal problem must also have this property of
monotonicity. In this paper, we exploit this monotonicity property to propose an efficient
method that makes it possible to numerically obtain optimal portfolios in law-invariant
frameworks. This result is useful, as analytical solutions2 are often not in reach and typi-
cally come at the cost of over-simplifying assumptions.
One problem, however, with optimal portfolios derived in law-invariant frameworks
1Bernard et al. (2015a) show that this is equivalent to having preferences that satisfy first-order stochastic
dominance (FSD). Interestingly, many economists consider a violation of this property as grounds for refuting
a particular theory; see e.g., Birnbaum (1997), Birnbaum & Navarrette (1998), Levy (2008) for further dis-
cussions and empirical evidence of FSD violations. To illustrate the importance of FSD consistency in the
literature, note for instance that Kahneman & Tversky (1979) have developed the cumulative prospect theory
(Tversky & Kahneman (1992)) in order to address the FSD violation of their original prospect theory.
2In the literature, a significant number of papers solve portfolio problems in a rather ad-hoc fashion and
aim at obtaining explicit formulae. In this regard, we refer to Merton’s expected utility problem (Merton 1969,
1971), Merton’s problem with the Basak-Shapiro Value-at-Risk constraint (Basak & Shapiro 2001), Browne’s
target probability optimization problem (Browne 1999), the optimal portfolio problem for a loss-averse in-
vestor as in Berkelaar et al. (2004) and optimal choice under Yaari’s dual theory (Yaari 1987, He & Zhou 2011).
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is that they provide their best outcomes in states of economic abundance, whereas many
investors would prefer to receive optimal payouts when the need is greatest, i.e., in states
of economic recession. A practical illustration of such considerations is the existence of the
insurance business. Specifically, most people are more inclined to receive money from an
insurer in the case of an event such as a fire destroying their property than to receive the
same amount as the result of a favorable lottery draw (Bernard & Vanduffel 2014). Many
fund managers also choose their portfolio composition conditionally on knowing the value
of some other portfolios or market indices (benchmarks). For example, changes in portfo-
lio weights can be driven by a volatility index such as the VIX, changes in interest rates or
a more general market index (Roll 1992). Moreover, the performance of fund managers is
often assessed relative to that of the sector in which they invest (Daniel et al. 1997), leading
to a tendency to benchmark accordingly. In all these cases, optimal investment decisions
are driven not by the pursuit of a law invariant objective, but by state-dependent prefer-
ences. A possible model that encompasses all the above examples is presented in Bernard
et al. (2015b), who also derive a characterization of optimal portfolios for state-dependent
preferences. Specifically, they extend Dybvig’s work by showing that when investors aim
at optimizing an objective that depends on a benchmark, the optimal portfolio is decreas-
ing in the state-price process, conditionally on this benchmark. In this paper, we exploit
this property to outline a numerical framework that makes it possible to obtain the optimal
portfolio for any state-dependent objective. We apply the algorithm to several classic port-
folio problems for which explicit solutions exist and show that our numerically obtained
solutions match them closely.
The algorithm that we propose makes it possible to deal efficiently with a wide range of
optimal portfolio selection problems for which no explicit solutions are readily available.
In particular, the algorithm allows us to incorporate in optimal portfolio selection problems
all types of risk constraints needed to build a realistic model. Doing so typically implies
that an explicit solution will no longer be available, but has the advantage of providing
an approximate solution to a problem that otherwise would be difficult to solve explic-
itly. For example, we find the optimal portfolio for an investor facing a CoVaR constraint
(Adrian & Brunnermeier 2011). The CoVaR recently appeared as a risk measure to assess
risk of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). The key insight is that an im-
portant component of the risk that a SIFI represents for the global economy (systemic risk)
arises from its dependence with the global financial system; higher systemic risk should be
compensated by higher capital requirements. Similarly, it appears reasonable to develop
strategies that aim at generating a sufficient level of income when the financial system as
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a whole is under stress. Technically, we extend the optimization of expected utility with
a VaR constraint (probability constraint) of Basak & Shapiro (2001) to a CoVaR constraint,
i.e., a conditional probability constraint, in which the conditioning event is a crisis. Finally,
the algorithm that we propose to deal with optimization problems for which no explicit
solutions are known may also be used to potentially guess the analytical solution of the
optimization problem at hand and to prove its optimality.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the financial market and the
general form of the optimal portfolio selection problems that we consider. In Section 3 we
specifically study law-invariant portfolio problems and provide an algorithm that makes it
possible to numerically obtain the respective optimal portfolios in these cases. We apply it
to some classical (non-)expected utility problems for which explicit solutions are available
and show that the numerical solutions are compatible with these. In Section 4 we add
state-dependent constraints to the setting and extend the algorithm to this case. We study
some examples in which the explicit solution is available and show that the algorithm
is able to reproduce them. We use the algorithm to solve relevant investment problems
(e.g., optimal portfolio choice under a CoVaR constraint) for which no explicit solution is
known. Final remarks are presented in Section 5.
2 Setting
Here we present the market model and describe the general form of portfolio problems
that we study in this paper.
2.1 Market Model
We consider an investor with a fixed horizon T without intermediate consumption. We
assume an arbitrage-free market in which a payoff XT received at time T can be valued at
present time as the expectation of XT multiplied by the state-price density3 ξT, i.e., its price
c(XT) is given as c(XT) = E [ξTXT], where the expectation is taken under the real-world
probability P. (We refer to Björk (2004) for extensive theory on arbitrage-free pricing.)
In other words, ξT is the discount factor that is used to compute the initial cost of XT.
Platen & Heath (2006) show that, under some general assumptions, discounting can be
done using the Growth Optimal Portfolio (GOP) as numéraire (deflator). Specifically, the
GOP is a portfolio with the property that it will almost surely accumulate more wealth
3The state-price ξt(ω) is the price per unit of probability P of the “atomic” time and state-contingent claim
(Arrow-Debreu security) that delivers one unit of a specific consumption good if a specific uncertain state ω
realizes at a specific future date t. For more information we refer to Eeckhoudt et al. (2011).
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than any other strategy at an infinite horizon. It can also be seen as the portfolio that has
maximum expected log-utility of terminal wealth at any horizon. Similarly to Platen &





, in which S?T is the
value at maturity T of one unit invested at time t = 0 in the GOP, i.e., ξT = 1/S?T. Note that
in the Black-Scholes market set-up the use of the GOP as numéraire for pricing payoffs is
the unique approach that is consistent with no-arbitrage.
2.2 Optimal Portfolio Choice





in which V(·) is the objective and the admissible set A is of the form
A =
XT
∣∣∣∣∣∣ c(XT) 6 W0 (budget constraint)risk constraints on XT
 . (1b)
A risk constraint can typically be expressed as ρ(XT) 6 ρ0, in which ρ(·) is a risk measure
and ρ0 is the maximum risk exposure. Note that the objective V(·) may depend solely on
the distribution of the final wealth XT (i.e., V is law-invariant), but it may also be state-
dependent in that the states in which cash flows are received matter. The same feature
holds true for the admissible set A: the risk constraints may be law-invariant or state-
dependent. When both the objective function and the risk constraints are law-invariant, we
say that the preferences are law-invariant (Section 3); otherwise, they are state-dependent
(Section 4).
3 Optimal Portfolio for Law-Invariant Preferences
In this section, we assume law-invariant preferences. Dybvig (1988), Carlier & Dana (2011)
and Bernard et al. (2014a) show that in this case solutions to optimal portfolio problems
must be decreasing in the state-price density and thus increasing in S?T.
4 This property
plays a key role in designing a new discrete algorithm that makes it possible to find the
optimal portfolio efficiently.
We first lay out the algorithm and next apply it to several classic optimization prob-
4Here, increasing refers to “non-decreasing”. Specifically, it does not mean that the portfolio is strictly
increasing in S?T .
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lems for which an explicit solution has been reported in the literature, such as the Mer-
ton problem of maximizing expected utility (Merton 1969, 1971), the Merton problem of
maximizing expected utility in the presence of a Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint (Basak &
Shapiro 2001), the optimal portfolio problem for the loss-averse investor (Berkelaar et al.
2004), and the optimal portfolio problem under Yaari’s dual theory (Yaari 1987, He & Zhou
2011). These examples show that the algorithm performs admirably in reproducing the
explicit solution and provides evidence that the algorithm can be used to solve any other
law-invariant optimal portfolio selection problem. In the second part of the paper we ex-
tend our algorithm to accommodate state-dependent preferences.
3.1 Optimal Portfolio Choice Algorithm
Set-up: The algorithm that we propose first requires a discretization of the problem. Let
s?1 , s
?
2 , . . . , s
?
n be n equiprobable (with respect to the real-world probability P) ordered re-
alizations (states) of the GOP, s?1 < s
?
2 < · · · < s?n. These realizations can be obtained by
Monte Carlo simulations. In this paper, they are computed by inverting the distribution










, for k = 1, 2, . . . , n. (2)
The discrete counterpart5 to Problem (1a) can be formulated as
max
(x1,x2,...,xn)∈Ad
f (x1, x2, . . . , xn), (3a)
in which the admissible set Ad (counterpart to (1b)) is given as
Ad :=









risk constraints on (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
 . (3b)
For the ease of presentation we omit the additional risk constraints6 when describing
the algorithm. Using the monotonicity property, the admissible set (3b) can be restricted
to the set (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣∣ x1 6 x2 6 · · · 6 xn1n ∑ni=1 xis?i 6 W0
 .
5A standard example of a law-invariant objective function is the expected utility functional, in which
V(X) = E [u(X)] . For the discretized version we would then obtain that f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 1n ∑
n
i=1 u(xi).
6An example of risk constraint is a Value-at-Risk constraint, i.e. P(XT > W) > 1− α, so that assuming
x1 6 x2 6 · · · 6 xn, and kn = α, it amounts to constraining (x1, x2, . . . , xn) in that W 6 xk must hold.
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Using the auxiliary variables yi = xi − xi−1 (with the convention x0 = 0), i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
we can then rewrite the optimization problem as
max
(y1,y2,...,yn)∈B
f (y1, y1 + y2, . . . , y1 + y2 + · · ·+ yn), (4a)
in which the admissible set is now given as
B :=
{
(y1, y2, . . . , yn) ∈ (R+)n
∣∣∣∣∣ n∑j=1 ζ jyj 6 W0
}









It is clear that this discretization yields an optimization problem with a set of linear con-
straints. Most importantly, by rewriting the side constraint (3b) as the side constraint (4b),
we greatly reduce the dimensionality of the problem, as we only need to look for solutions
in the first orthant.
As the objective in (4a) is generally non-concave, multiple optima can exist. However,
the global optimum is known to be increasing in the GOP and our formulation (4) enforces
this feature, hence avoiding the pitfall that the routine will produce a solution that cannot
be a global optimum. For an overview of the theory and numerical techniques for opti-
mization models involving one or more constraints on distribution functions we refer to
Dentcheva (2006). For an in-depth review of shape constrained optimization we refer to
d’Aspremont (2004). In this paper, we will rely on a built-in feature of a software pack-
age to find a minimum of a constrained nonlinear multi-variable function. Specifically, the
numerical solution of (4) is constructed in MATLAB R© (2013) with the help of the built-in
function7 fmincon. Our routine starts with an initial guess regarding the optimum: We
know that the solution must be increasing in the GOP and that its cost must be below the
budget W0. Specifically, we take as initial solution X
(0)
0,T := δ log(1 + S
?
T), where δ is chosen
to satisfy the budget constraint and its realizations are computed in a straightforward way
from those of S?T (see (2)). We also tested other choices for the initial guess and found that
the algorithm is robust to changes in this initial condition. We have carefully designed
a procedure, which consists of increasing the number of discretization points incremen-
tally with each iteration step. It allows us to find the true solution whenever the initial
discretization level n0 (used for discretizing the initial guess X
(0)
0,T) is small enough (say,
n0 6 20); see also the numerical examples in Sections 3 and 4 for additional evidence.
7The function implements an active-set algorithm that solves the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) equations;
see Nocedal & Wright (2006) and Floudas & Pardalos (2009). When the objective and constraints are twice
differentiable and have Lipschitz continuous second derivatives in a neighbourhood of the optimum, the
algorithm converges to the optimum when one starts close enough to it; see Chapter 18 of Nocedal & Wright
(2006) and Hanson (1981, 1999).
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Indeed, the number nk of discretization points in each iteration (k = 0, 1, .., K) plays an
important role and has to be considered carefully. On the one hand, the larger nk, the more
unknown variables there are and the more difficult it is a priori for MATLAB R© to find the
optimal solution. On the other hand, the larger nk, the better the discretization and thus
the accuracy of the approximation of continuous distributions by discrete distributions.
Taking into account these observations and trade-offs, we propose the following approach
that refines the discretization at each step by doubling the number of discretization points
whilst making it possible to improve upon the initial guess.
Description of the algorithm: First, from the initial guess X(0)0,T, obtained with very
few discretization points (say, n0 = 20) we obtain, through optimization, a rough estimate
X∗0,T := X
(N0)
0,T of the optimal solution X
?






0,T, . . .
and will halt when internal tolerances are met, say at N0. The obtained estimate X∗0,T :=
X(N0)0,T suffers from a too coarse discretization (as n0=20), but it already has the right “shape”
and has, typically, already improved the objective function significantly. Next, we double
the discretization points to n1 = 40 and use standard linear interpolation and extrapolation
(implemented in MATLAB R© ) to extend the estimate X∗0,T (20 outcomes that are increasing
in a coarsely discretized GOP) to X(0)1,T (40 outcomes related to a more finely discretized
GOP), which will then serve as the new starting point of the routine. The iterations will
halt, say at N1, and a new estimate X∗1,T := X
(N1)
1,T of the optimal solution X
?
T is obtained.
After repeating these steps K times we have obtained K + 1 approximations X∗k,T (k =
0, . . . , K) of X?T, each related to a more finely discretized GOP of nk = 2
kn0 equiprobable
outcomes. Algorithm PA-SIP outlines our routine in pseudo-code, which is also visualized
in Figure 1.






















Figure 1: Diagram of Algorithm PA-SIP.
Conceiving the routine in this way makes it possible for the algorithm to find the
optimal solution; by doubling the number of points five times and by using 20 points
(n0 = 20) for the first run, we found in our examples that we can accurately solve opti-
mization problems with n5 = 640 discretization points, i.e., 640 unknowns to determine.
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Algorithm PA-SIP: Portfolio Algorithm for State-Independent Preferences
input : n0, K, tolerances, GOP S?T , budget W0, objective obj, risk constraints constr
output : K + 1 discrete random variables approximating X?T
call : (x∗0 , x
∗
1 , . . . , x
∗
K)← PA-SIP(obj,constr;n0, K, W0, S?T)
// Choose n0 discretization points.
1 n0 ← 20;
// Compute ordered equiprobable sample of size n0 of S?T .
2 s?0 = (s
?





// Take X(0)0,T := δ log(1 + S
?





3 x(0)0 = (x
(0)
0,1 , . . . , x
(0)
0,n0
)← StartingPoint(s?0 , W0); // x
(0)
0,j = δ log(1 + s
?
0,j)
// Obtain by optimization n0 realizations of X?T .
4 N0 ← 0;
5 while tolerances are not met do
6 x(N0+1)0 = (x
(N0+1)
0,1 , . . . , x
(N0+1)
0,n0
)← Optimize(obj,constr;s?0 , x
(N0)
0 , W0);
7 N0 ← N0 + 1;
// Define X∗0,T the n0-discrete random variable approximating X
?
T by using n0 discretization points.
8 x∗0 ← x
(N0)
0 ;
9 for k← 1 to K do
// Double the number of discretization points.
10 nk ← 2nk−1;
// Compute ordered equiprobable sample of size nk of S?T .
11 s?k = (s
?
k,1, . . . , s
?
k,nk
)← SampleGOP(nk, S?T); // by (2): s?k−1,`−1 < s?k,` < s?k,`+1 < s?k−1,`




k−1}, to construct a starting point X
(0)
k,T
by linear interpolation at s?k .
12 x(0)k = (x
(0)
k,1 , . . . , x
(0)
k,nk





// Obtain by optimization nk realizations of X?T .
13 Nk ← 0;
14 while tolerances are not met do
15 x(Nk+1)k = (x
(Nk+1)
k,1 , . . . , x
(Nk+1)
k,nk
)← Optimize(obj,constr;s?k , x
(Nk)
k , W0);
16 Nk ← Nk + 1;
// Define X∗k,T the nk-discrete random variable approximating X
?
T by using nk discretization points.
17 x∗k ← x
(Nk)
k ;
In summary, the algorithm builds crucially on the monotonicity property that the op-
timal solution must have with the GOP (to reduce the dimensionality of the problem) and
on a careful design of the initial guess by choosing the number of discretization points
dynamically. Otherwise, it would be merely a matter of luck to find a solution that is close
to the true optimal one. Indeed, although the algorithm in MATLAB R© is very powerful
for solving multidimensional optimization problems, it will typically fail to find the global
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optimum if we run the algorithm directly with a very large number of discretization points.
In the following subsections, we apply our method to some standard optimal portfolio
choice problems. Let us insist here that the goodness of the results is derived from the
construction of the algorithm itself. Any naive approach consisting of directly discretizing
finely a grid without a good initial condition will lead to inaccurate results and suboptimal
portfolio choices.
3.2 Application of the Portfolio Algorithm to State-Independent Preferences
We illustrate Algorithm PA-SIP with four examples in a two-dimensional Black-Scholes
market, in which individual volatility coefficients for the two assets are σ1 and σ2 and their
correlation coefficient is ρ12. Unless otherwise stated, the parameters are set as follows. The
drift and volatility of each asset are given by µ1 = 0.03, σ1 = 0.20 and µ2 = 0.04, σ2 = 0.30.






(see e.g. Bernard et al. (2011) or Bernard et al. (2015b) for a detailed description of the
multidimensional Black-Scholes model). Finally, the correlation ρ12 is taken to be equal to
0.25, the investment horizon is T = 6 months and the initial budget W0 is equal to 100.
These parameters are summarized in Table 1. The GOP can then be expressed (see also
Table 1: Values of the parameters for the numerical examples.
r µ1 µ2 σ1 σ2 ρ12 T W0 S?0
0.01 0.03 0.04 0.2 0.3 0.25 0.5 100 1















is a standard Brownian motion under the measure P at time T. This enables us to compute


















, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
where Φ is the distribution function of a standard normal random variable; see also (2).
3.2.1 Merton’s expected utility problem (Merton 1971)
A dominant decision theory in economics is the expected utility theory (EUT) of von Neu-
mann & Morgenstern (1947). The optimal portfolio in an EUT framework was first derived
by Merton (1969, 1971), and the problem in this case is often referred to as Merton’s prob-
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lem. Merton performed his analysis under Inada’s conditions (Inada 1963) on u(x). We
recall here the analytical solution.
Proposition 3.1. Assuming that the utility function is concave, increasing and differentiable on
R+, with limx→0 u′(x) = +∞ and limx→+∞ u′(x) = 0, the optimal payoff of the Merton expected








, where θ is determined
by the budget constraint c(X?T) = W0.
Note that X?T in Proposition 3.1 is indeed increasing in the GOP. We illustrate our nu-
merical method using the following utility function (CRRA utility function):
uη(w) =
log(w) η = 11
1−η w
1−η η 6= 1,
(5)
in which η > 0 is the so-called coefficient of relative risk aversion. First, we discretize the









uη(y1 + y2 + · · ·+ yi)
with the admissible set as in (4b):
B :=
{
(y1, y2, . . . , yn) ∈ (R+)n
∣∣∣∣∣ n∑j=1 ζ jyj 6 W0
}









The application of Algorithm PA-SIP leads to the results displayed in Figure 2 for K =
5, so nK = 20 · 25 = 640.
In both panels of Figure 2, we also show the initial guess X(0)0,T that serves as input for
the algorithm, the optimal one that is obtained as its output (that is, X∗5,T) and the analytical
solution (see Proposition 3.1).
The graph presented in Panel 2(a) shows very good agreement between the theoretical
and numerical results. The algorithm constructs a payoff with expected utility of 31.0256,
which is exactly (as an approximation with 4 digits) the utility of the theoretical optimum.
Note also that the initial guess deviates from the optimal solution, indicating that the op-
timization procedure is able to accommodate a suboptimal initial choice. These results are
confirmed in Panel 2(b). The numerical and theoretical solutions match closely. Moreover,
our algorithm constructs a payoff with expected utility of 4.6142, which is again very close
to the exact number that is equal to 4.6141.
11






































numerical solution (Merton), V(X
T
)=31.03




(a) η = 0.35









































numerical solution (Merton), V(X
T
)=4.614




(b) η = 1
Figure 2: Optimal portfolios for Merton’s problem.
3.2.2 Merton’s expected utility problem with VaR constraint (Basak & Shapiro 2001)
The analysis of Merton’s problem confirms that in a law-invariant setting the optimal pay-
off goes along with the GOP and thus offers little income in declining markets. Investors
may feel uncomfortable with this feature. Moreover, in practice, portfolio managers of-
ten face constraints stemming from regulations and/or internal policies. Basak & Shapiro
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(2001) incorporate these concerns into Merton’s problem using a Value-at-Risk (VaR) risk
measure that ensures that the minimum value of terminal wealth remains above a mini-
mum level with desired probability.
Specifically, Basak & Shapiro (2001) consider as a risk constraint ρ(XT) := P(XT 6 W),
with W ∈ R+ and ρ0 := α ∈ [0, 1]; or, equivalently, they consider the risk constraint
P(XT > W) > 1− α. Let us refer to
max
XT∈A
E [u(XT)] , A =
XT
∣∣∣∣∣∣ c(XT) 6 W0P(XT > W) > 1− α , XT > 0
 (7)
as the Basak-Shapiro VaR constrained problem. The constraint P(XT > W) > 1− α re-
quires an agent to have terminal wealth higher than W with probability 1− α at least, i.e.,
VaRα(XT) := F−1XT (α) > W. Basak & Shapiro (2001) show that this problem can be solved
explicitly and we recall their analytical solution hereafter. In this regard, note that in order
to ensure that the set A is not empty, the budget needs to be sufficiently high, leading to
the assumption VaRα(XT) := F−1XT (α) > W. Finally, the Basak-Shapiro VaR constrained
problem with α = 0 reduces to portfolio insurance, as the terminal wealth is constrained
to be above W in all states.
Proposition 3.2. Let 0 6 We−rT 6 W0 and assume that the utility function u is strictly increas-
ing and that its derivative u′ exists and is strictly decreasing (from +∞ at 0 to 0+ at +∞). The















where θ is determined by the budget constraint c(X?T) = W0, S
?
= θ/u′(W) and S? is such that
P(S?T < S
?) = α.
We apply Algorithm PA-SIP to the Basak-Shapiro VaR constrained problem using the
CRRA utility function uη as given in (5). We first discretize the risk constraint that appears
in the admissible set: Put k := dnαe ∈N. Then we have
P(XT > W) > 1− α ⇐⇒ FXT (W) 6 α 6
k
n
= FXT (xk) =⇒ W 6 xk
because FXT (xi) = FS?T (s
?
i ) = i/n (due to the monotonicity property of the optimal so-
lution). Hence, we obtain the following discretized problem maxy∈B 1n ∑
n
i=1 uη(y1 + y2 +
13
· · ·+ yi) with the admissible set given as
B =
(y1, y2, . . . , yn) ∈ (R+)n
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
n
j=1 ζ jyj 6 W0
y1 + y2 + · · ·+ ydnαe > W
 , ζ j := 1n n∑i=j 1s?i .
We present the results in Figure 3 for K = 5, so nK = 20 · 25 = 640.








































numerical solution (Basak−Shapiro), V(X
T
)=31















(a) η = 0.35











































numerical solution (Basak−Shapiro), V(X
T
)=4.614















(b) η = 1
Figure 3: Optimal portfolios for Merton’s problem with Basak-Shapiro VaR constraint.
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In both panels of Figure 3, we display the initial choice X(0)0,T of the algorithm, the opti-
mal one that is obtained as output of the algorithm (that is, X∗5,T) and the analytical solution
(Proposition 3.2).
Both panels show that there is again good agreement between the numerical and the-
oretical results. In particular, the algorithm is able to accurately produce the discontinuity
(jump) in the analytic solution of Basak & Shapiro (2001). Furthermore, the expected utili-
ties of the numerical solutions closely match those of the analytical solutions.
3.2.3 Loss-averse investor (Berkelaar et al. 2004)
In a seminal work, Kahneman & Tversky (1979) provided evidence that losses loom larger
than gains in the perception of investors, for which reason they proposed a different util-
ity function that is not always concave over terminal wealth. This is further developed
in Berkelaar et al. (2004), who state that investors care about changes in their wealth level
(with respect to a benchmark) rather than about their absolute wealth levels. In addition,
the objective function is S-shaped with a convex part below the reference point and a con-
cave part above. This setting is appealing as there is evidence that it is a realistic way in
which to model preferences. Berkelaar et al. (2004) studied the optimal portfolio choice
in this setting, and we refer to this problem as the optimal portfolio problem for the loss-
averse investor. Specifically, one chooses the following utility function, defined over losses
and gains relative to a reference level p:
uB(x) =
−C1(p− x)
γ1 x 6 p
C2(x− p)γ2 p < x
. (9)
For loss aversion and increasing preferences one needs C1 > C2 > 0. Requiring γi < 1
(i = 1, 2) ensures risk-seeking for losses (convex) and risk-aversion for gains (concave).
Berkelaar et al. (2004) derive the optimal portfolio in this setting, and we recall their result
first.


























and θ > 0 is determined by the budget constraint c(X?T) = W0.
Note that X?T in (10) is indeed increasing in the GOP. Moreover, as long as the GOP
stays below a threshold S?, X?T takes the value zero. When the GOP is above a threshold
S?, the payoff X?T jumps to the reference level p and stays above.
We illustrate the solution of the optimal portfolio problem for a maturity of T = 5
years (so S? is clearly visible) and a reference level p = 95. The other parameter values
are C1 = 2.25, C2 = 1 and we also take γ1 = γ2; see also Kahneman & Tversky (1979) and
Berkelaar et al. (2004).
The numerical results that we obtain by applying Algorithm PA-SIP are displayed in
Figure 4 and contrasted with the analytical solutions. In Panel 4(a) we take γ1 = 0.88 = γ2.
Once more the numerical solution conforms well with the analytical solution. The initial
guess has utility equal to 8.191 but our algorithm constructs a payoff with utility value
equal to 11.005, which is again very close to the optimal value of 11.048. In Panel 4(b) we
use γ1 = 0.82 (other parameters remain unchanged). The initial guess has utility equal to
8.808. Our algorithm constructs a payoff with utility equal to 13.563, whereas the optimal
value is 13.616.
16













































numerical solution (Berkelaar et al.), V(X
T
)=11




(a) γ1 = 0.88













































numerical solution (Berkelaar et al.), V(X
T
)=14




(b) γ1 = 0.82
Figure 4: Optimal portfolios for the loss-averse investor.
3.2.4 Optimal portfolio choice under Yaari’s dual theory (Yaari 1987)
Following Machina (1987, 1995, 2004), beginning with the work of Allais (1953) and Ed-
wards (1955, 1962) in the early 1950s, some of the key axioms of expected utility theory
have become increasingly challenged. This trend has led to the development of non-
expected utility models of risk/preferences, which seek to better reflect preferences, while
17
retaining as much as possible of the analytical power of the expected utility models. The
dual theory of choice of Yaari (1987) builds on a new set of axioms. In this latter frame-




x d(1− w(1− FX(x))) =
∫ +∞
0
w (P [XT > x])dx, (11)
where w : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a distortion function with w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1. Risk aversion is
obtained if w is convex (Yaari 1987, Theorem 2).
Let us define the Yaari non-expected utility problem as the optimization problem (1) in
which the objective function is the Yaari functional V(XT) given in (11) and the admissible
set A is the set of payoffs that satisfy the budget constraint. This problem was recently
solved by He & Zhou (2011) under some assumptions regarding the auxiliary function
M(z) := w′(1− z)F−1S?T (1− z). We recall their solution.
Proposition 3.4. Assume that M(z), given above, is continuous and uni-modal on (0, 1): there
exists z̃ ∈ (0, 1) such that M is strictly increasing on (0, z̃) and strictly decreasing on (z̃, 1). The












) · 1{S?<S?T}, (12)














The results of our numerical procedure are displayed in Figure 5. Here we use the mar-
ket parameters of Table 1 and similarly to those in the example of He & Zhou (2011), we
take the distortion w(x) = xγ with γ > 1 (proportional hazard model). In Panel 5(a) we
take the proportional hazard parameter γ = 1.1. We observe again a very good correspon-
dence between the numerical solution and the exact one (it can be verified that the condi-
tion of Proposition 12 is satisfied). The initial guess yields a value for the Yaari objective
function (distorted expectation) that is equal to 100.3765. Our algorithm constructs a pay-
off with objective value 101.4449, which is very close to the optimal value of 101.4454. In
Panel 5(b) we increase the proportional hazard parameter to γ = 1.2 (all other parameters
8Given a distribution function FX(x) we denote its survival function by FX(x) = 1− FX(x).
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remain unchanged). The initial wealth distribution (dotted) has a distorted expectation of
99.9026. Our algorithm constructs a payoff with objective value equal to 100.4674, whereas
the optimal value 100.4663.








































numerical solution (Yaari), V(X
T
)=101.44




(a) γ = 1.1





































numerical solution (Yaari), V(X
T
)=100.47




(b) γ = 1.2
Figure 5: Optimal portfolios under Yaari’s dual theory.
19
3.3 Additional evidence of the performance of the algorithm
The examples in Section 3.2 illustrate, numerically and graphically, that Algorithm PA-SIP
appears suitable for solving optimal portfolio problems under law-invariant preferences,
i.e., in all examples the numerical and theoretical solutions match closely. In this section
we further analyze the performance of the algorithm.
Convergence: We analyze the distance between the intermediate solutions and the an-
alytical solutions and assess the extent to which they show subsequent improvements. In
order to obtain a meaningful comparison, we first extend the subsequent approximations
X∗k,T (k = 0, . . . , K) to a common base, which corresponds to the finest discretization of
GOP; i.e., we consider nK equiprobable values in s?K and interpolate and extrapolate the
intermediate solutions X∗k,T (k = 1, 2, . . . , K) using these nK discretization points. For ease
of presentation we do not introduce a new notation for these extended versions of the
solutions. The payoff-wise resp. objective-wise distance between a numerically obtained
















In Figure 6, we plot for all discussed applications the distances (on log-scale) as a func-
tion of the number k = 1, 2, . . . , K.
We observe that in all cases the algorithm yields intermediate solutions that gradually
improve. We stress that this feature is not an obvious point and is achieved thanks to the
subsequent refinement of the initial point X(0)k,T , as described in Section 3.1. If one naively
uses the same starting point and runs the algorithm with a larger number of discretiza-
tion points, then, according to our observations, the performance ultimately deteriorates
because the number of unknown variables in the algorithm increases and the optimization
problem fed into the solver fmincon is of larger dimensions. In our case, the distance de-
creases in all of the examples studied above and show close correspondence between theo-
retical and numerical solutions. In this regard, note that the objective-wise distance δKk (V)
appears to yield a better performance than the payoff-wise distance δKk (X). However, the
objective-wise distance δKk (X) is the one explicitly being minimized in the procedure. As
the objective-wise distance gets smaller, the solution gets closer to the true solution, which
in turn decreases δKk (X), but not necessarily with the same (relative) amount. Moreover,
the objective-wise distance δKk (V) involves the L1 norm whereas the payoff-wise distance
20
δKk (X) used the L2 norm.
9
































































Figure 6: Performance metrics of the algorithm.
Through extensive performance tests of our proposed algorithm, we also confirmed
that the property that the solution must be monotonic is key for the algorithm to converge
to the optimal portfolio. If the monotonicity property is not imposed upfront by reformu-
9In fact, if one would define the payoff-wise distance as δ̃Kk (X) :=
E[|X∗k,T−X?T |]
E[|X?T |]
, one would observe that its
magnitude in all eamples becomes much smaller.
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lating the problem with the unknown non-negative variables (y1, y2, . . . , yn) instead of the
unknown variables (x1, x2, . . . , xn), the optimizer fmincon often misses the optimal solu-
tion and may even converge to a candidate solution that does not satisfy the monotonicity
property or does not satisfy the constraints of the problem.
Sensitivity analysis: We conclude this section with a short sensitivity analysis to pro-
vide a comparison of the performance of the algorithm across various parameters. To do
so, we perturb the base case of parameters (see Table 1), and check the impact on the per-
formance of the algorithm. The parameters µ1 and σ1 are first changed in such a way that
the market price of risk, i.e., µ1−rσ1 = 0.1 remains the same (cases (2) and (3) in Tables 2
and 3 hereafter) and then to a higher value (cases (4) and (5)). We also assess the impact
of dependence by using all parameters from the base case except the correlation level ρ
(Cases (6) and (7)).
Next, we assess for all these seven cases the impact on the solutions obtained for the
Basak-Sahpiro VaR constrained problem (Section 3.2.2) and the Berkelaar optimization
problem (Section ), respectively, using the payoff-wise distance δKk (X) and objective-wise
distance δKk (V) (k = 2, 5) as the yardstick. The results are reported in Table 2 and Table
3, respectively. We find that the algorithm performs consistently well across various pa-
rameter ranges. The algorithm thus proves to be very useful, as it makes it possible to
deal with any law-invariant problem, specifically those for which we do not know the
analytical solution up front. Furthermore, this algorithm enables to potentially guess the
analytical solution and to prove its optimality. Finally, the algorithm plays a key role in the
following solutions to state-dependent optimal portfolio problems. As we will see in the
next section, these problems are challenging, but very natural to consider, as individuals’
preferences tend to be impacted by economic states (i.e., investors may not have the same
risk aversion when the market is under stress as when the market is in normal conditions).
Nevertheless, very few such optimization problems are solved explicitly in the literature;
our algorithm provides a method for doing so.
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Table 2: Analysis of the Performance of Algorithm PA-SIP, case Basak-Shapiro (log prefer-








(1) Base case (Table 1) 0.0073 0.7393e-4 0.0023 0.0131e-4
(2) λ• = 0.1, σ1 = 0.3, µ1 = 0.04 0.0073 0.0729e-4 0.0023 0.0125e-4
(3) λ• = 0.1, σ1 = 0.1, µ1 = 0.02 0.0073 0.0730e-4 0.0023 0.0131e-4
(4) λ• = 0.2, σ1 = 0.3, µ1 = 0.07 0.0261 0.1168e-3 0.0066 0.0184e-3
(5) λ• = 0.2, σ1 = 0.1, µ1 = 0.03 0.0261 0.1167e-3 0.0067 0.0185e-3
(6) ρ = 0.5 0.0055 0.0416e-4 0.0047 0.0320e-4
(7) ρ = 0.1 0.0086 0.1028e-4 0.0025 0.0159e-4








(1) Base case (Table 1) 0.4012 0.0312 0.2051 0.0148
(2) σ1 = 0.3, µ1 = 0.04 0.4012 0.0312 0.1729 0.0116
(3) σ1 = 0.1, µ1 = 0.02 0.4012 0.0312 0.2051 0.0148
(4) σ1 = 0.3, µ1 = 0.07 0.7412 0.1246 0.4271 0.0248
(5) σ1 = 0.1, µ1 = 0.03 0.7412 0.1246 0.3613 0.0172
(6) ρ = 0.5 0.3583 0.0258 0.1746 0.0198
(7) ρ = 0.1 0.4852 0.0425 0.2085 0.0108
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4 Optimal Portfolios for State-Dependent Preferences
Optimal portfolios for investors with law-invariant preferences have the property that the
worst outcomes are obtained when the market declines. This feature does not correspond
to the observation that investors may value a dollar that is received during economic re-
cession more than when one received during economic expansion. The fact that investors
care about the states in which they receive money is confirmed by the widespread practice
according to which fund managers aim at tracking or beating a certain benchmark portfo-
lio. Investment decisions can also be driven by market signals, such as changes in volatility
and interest rates, or influenced by the performance of competitors.
To model state-dependent preferences, we use benchmarks. Specifically, we denote by
A the benchmark, i.e., a vector of random variables, that influences the investor’s invest-
ment decision (e.g., stock or volatility indices, interest rates, asset prices or competitors’






where the objective VA and the risk constraints may all depend on the random vector A.
Theorem 4.1 hereafter characterizes solutions to the state-dependent problem (14). In
particular, it is shown that the solutions can be considered as increasing in the GOP, condi-
tionally on the benchmark. This characterization significantly reduces the dimensionality
of problem (14) and makes it possible to extend Algorithm PA-SIP to accommodate state-
dependent constraints and to solve complex state-dependent investment problems.
Theorem 4.1 (Optimal strategies). Let A be a d-dimensional random vector and assume that
FS?T |A is continuously distributed. Assume that the objective function VA and risk constraints
are non-decreasing10 and law-invariant, conditionally on A.11 If there exists a solution XT to
problem (14), then there exists X?T, which is increasing in S
∗
T conditionally on A and also solves
problem (14).
Proof. Let XT be a solution. It follows from Lemma (A.2) in Bernard et al. (2015b) that
U = FS?T |A(S
?
T) is uniformly distributed on (0, 1), stochastically independent of A and
increasing in S?T conditionally on A. Consider the payoff YT = F
−1
XT |A(U). Invoking Lemma
10When X 6 Y, almost surely, then i) VA(X) 6 VA(Y) and ii) if X meets the risk constraints, then Y also
meets the risk constraints.
11If FX|A = FY|A, then i) VA(X) = VA(Y) and ii) if X meets the risk constraints, then Y also meets the risk
constraints.
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(A.2) in Bernard et al. (2015b) again, (XT, A) ∼ (YT, A) and












where the inequality follows from the Frechet-Hoeffding bounds and from the fact that
F−1XT |A(U) and S
?
T are comonotonic, conditionally on A. Since (XT, A) ∼ (YT, A), it fol-
lows that YT satisfies the risk constraints, and that VA(YT) = VA(XT) (conditional law-
invariance). Furthermore, there exists a non-negative constant a such that X?T := YT + a
has cost W0. The payoff X?T also satisfies the risk constraints, and VA(X
?
T) > VA(YT) (in-
creasing preferences). Hence, X?T is at least as good as XT; note also that it is increasing in
S∗T conditionally on A and also solves problem (14).
From the proof, every admissible solution XT to Problem (14) can be improved by a
payoff X?T that is increasing in the GOP, i.e., S
?
T, conditionally on A. Furthermore, denote
by G the joint distribution of (X?T, A). One has that X
?




i.e., X?T is the cheapest possible payoff having joint distribution G with the benchmark A.
The solution to this cost-efficiency problem was first provided in Theorem 3.4 of Bernard
et al. (2015b); see also Theorem 4.4 in Bernard & Tang (2016).
4.1 Optimal Portfolio Choice Algorithm (State-Dependent Preferences)
In this section, we outline the algorithm for solving the state-dependent problem (14). For
ease of exposition, we ignore the potential presence of state-dependent risk constraints.
Set-up: Similarly as in the case with law invariant preferences (Section 3.1), we dis-
cretize the problem. The benchmark A may have a discrete distribution with P[A = aj] =
pj for j = 1, . . . , m (so pj > 0 and ∑mj=1 pj = 1), and when A is continuously distributed,






1, 2, . . . , m meaning that in this instance pj ≡ 1/m.
We consider nm states with corresponding realizations of the random couple (A, S?T),
which are obtained as follows. Consider the m outcomes from the benchmark A, i.e., a1 <
. . .< am. For each value aj of the benchmark, we simulate n equiprobable values of the
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, i = 1, 2, . . . , n; j = 1, 2, . . . , m. In this way, we obtain
the following matrix:

(a1, s?11) (a2, s
?
12) · · · (am, s?1m)
(a1, s?21) (a2, s
?





(a1, s?n1) (a2, s
?
n2) · · · (am, s?nm)
 .
All of the elements in a given column j are equiprobable with probability pjn . Without loss of
generality, we assume that for each j = 1, . . . , m, the n realizations of the GOP are ordered
as s?1j < s
?
2j < · · · < s?nj. Let x∗ij be the corresponding optimal wealth value in each of the

















In a similar way as in the case of state-independent problems, the optimization prob-
lem (15) suffers from the very large number of unknown variables (here, nm unknown
variables xij). However, from Theorem 4.1 the optimal portfolio must be conditionally in-
creasing in the GOP (Theorem 4.1), and this makes it possible to reduce the dimensionality
of the optimization problem (15a). Specifically, we formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. For each j = 1, . . . , m, the optimal wealth levels x∗1j, x
∗
2j,. . . , x
∗
nj of the optimiza-
tion problem (15) above are such that x∗1j 6 x
∗
2j 6 · · · 6 x∗nj.
To make use of the result in Proposition 4.2, we introduce auxiliary variables yij =




















By considering the admissible set (15b’) instead of (15b), we look for a solution in a
space that is bounded from below. The optimization routine is more stable and converges
better. Given the considerable number of variables, it is of utmost importance to construct
the initial guess for the algorithm as closely as possible to the optimum in order to have a
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chance that the optimization procedure over nm unknown variables will converge to the
global optimal solution when n increases.12
Description of the algorithm:
Step 1: We construct the best solution for an initial level of discretization n0, say n0 =
20. We split the optimization problem (15a) into solving m problems for law-invariant pref-
erences. Specifically, for each j = 1, 2, . . . , m we solve on a coarse grid of size n0 = 20 and
with (conditional) budget W?−1,j = W0 the optimization problem (15a), conditionally on
A = aj. To do so, we use m times Algorithm PA-SIP (each involving an optimization over
n0 unknowns) and obtain the m (conditional) optima X?0,j, j = 1, 2, . . . , m. Note that the
choice of taking all conditional budgets W−1,j equal to each other is arbitrary, but natural
in that there is a priori no reason to justify differences among the conditional budgets ac-
cording to the different values taken by the benchmark A. The m (conditional) optima X?0,j,
j = 1, 2, . . . , m are next combined to obtain an initial (unconditional) guess regarding the
optimal terminal wealth, which we feed into the global optimization of (15a) with n0m un-
known variables. We rerun the optimization until the objective value no longer improves
(with a given tolerance level at machine precision), and we thus obtain our best solution
X?0,T for this level of discretization. From the resulting optimum X
?
0,T, we can determine


















∣∣∣∣ A = aj]︸ ︷︷ ︸
W?0,j
P(A = aj). (16)










1, 2, . . . , m.
Step 2: We refine the procedure sequentially by doubling the number of discretization
points. Hence, we take n1 = 2n0 and solve, on a refined grid, m law-invariant problems,
conditionally on A = aj with updated conditional budgets W?0,j (j = 1, 2, . . . , m) and using
the optimum X?0,T that we obtained after the first step (appropriately extended to the finer
grid) to yield the (conditional) starting points. The optima that next result from application
of Algorithm PA-SIP (with n1 unknown variables) are again combined into a starting point
of the global optimization of (15a) with n1m unknown variables. The resulting optimum
X?1,T will exhibit new conditional budgets W
?
1,j. This doubling procedure is repeated K
times, resulting in a numerical optimum X?K,T on nK = 2
Kn0 discretization points over m
states of the benchmark A with conditional budgets W?K,j among them. A more complete
12A natural extension is to also increase m.
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layout of our routine in pseudo-code is provided in Algorithm PA-SDP.
Algorithm PA-SDP: Portfolio Algorithm for State-Dependent Preferences
input : n0, K, tolerances, GOP S?T , benchmark A, budget W0, objective obj, risk constraints
constr
output : nK-discrete random variable approximating X?T | A, optimal budget split
call : (X?K, W
?
K)← PA-SDP(obj,constr;n0, K, W0, S?T , A)
// Choose n0 discretization points.
1 n0 ← 20;
// Start with conditional budgets that are all equal.
2 W?−1 = (W
?
−1,1, . . . , W
?
−1,m)← (W0, . . . , W0);
3 for j← 1 to m do
// Compute ordered equiprobable sample of size n0 of S?T | A.
4 s?0,j = (s
?
0;1,j, . . . , s
?
0;n0,j
)← SampleGOP(n0, S?T | A = aj);
// Solve state-independent case with given budget.
5 x?0,j ← PA-SIP(obj,constr;n0, 0, W?0,j, S?T | A = aj)(1);
6 S?0 ← (s?0,1, . . . , s?0,m); X
(0)
0 ← (x?0,1, . . . , x?0,m);
// Obtain by optimization n0 realizations of X?T | A.
7 N0 ← 0;
8 while tolerances are not met do
9 X
(N0+1)
0 ← Optimize(obj,constr;S?0 ,X
(N0)
0 , W0); N0 ← N0 + 1;
// Define X?0,T | A the n0-discrete random variable approximating X?T | A by using n0 discretization
points.
10 X?0 ← X
(N0)
0 ;
// Compute the conditional budgets.
11 W?0 ← BudgetSplit(S?0 ,X?0);
12 for k← 1 to K do
// Double the number of discretization points.
13 nk ← 2nk−1;
// Start with the conditional budgets from the previous step.
14 W?k ← W
?
k−1;
15 for j← 1 to m do
// Compute ordered equiprobable sample of size nk of S?T | A.
16 s?k,j = (s
?
k;1,j, . . . , s
?
k;nk ,j
)← SampleGOP(nk, S?T | A = aj);
// Solve state-independent case with given budget.




T | A = aj)(k + 1);
18 S?k ← (s
?






k,1, . . . , x
?
k,m);
// Obtain by optimization nk realizations of X?T | A.
19 Nk ← 0;







k , W0); Nk ← Nk + 1;
// Define X?k,T | A the nk-discrete random variable approximating X
?
T | A by using nk discretization
points.
22 X?k ← X
(Nk)
k ;
// Compute the conditional budgets.






4.2 Application of the Portfolio Algorithm for State-Dependent Preferences
We provide a series of examples of portfolio choice problems with state-dependent fea-
tures. Here, state-dependence may arise from a utility function that itself is state-dependent
(Section 4.2.1) or from constraints imposed on the resulting optimal portfolio (Section 4.2.2).
4.2.1 Merton type problems with state-dependent utility
We examine two Merton-type problems with state-dependent utility functions that are of
economic interest. In both cases analytical solutions are available and we are thus able to
assess the performance of Algorithm PA-SDP in finding the solution. As for the bench-
mark, we consider the (discretized) GOP at some time t < T, i.e., we take A = W0S?t . Note
that by varying the parameter t, we have the flexibility to let the benchmark A take various
forms. Moreover, joint sampling from A and S?T is straightforward.




E [u(A, XT)] , u(a, x) = 2
√
ax.
The value of a payoff is thus essentially measured as the expectation of its (geometric)
average with the benchmark A. The benchmark might be another portfolio of the investor,
which she cannot adjust (e.g., a pension fund managed by her employer), but which clearly
affects her future welfare. By taking the geometric average we consider the presence of this
benchmark portfolio in a meaningful way.
Using pathwise optimization, it can be readily shown that the optimal solution to the




2, where θ follows from the budget
constraint (see Proposition 1 of Bernard et al. (2018)). Furthermore, since the conditions
of Theorem 4.1 are fulfilled the use of Algorithm PA-SDP is justified, and a numerical
solution can be obtained. In Figure 7, we present the numerical solution (for the level of
discretization m = 2) provided by the algorithm and contrast it with the exact solution.
We observe that there is a close correspondence, which demonstrates the potential of the
algorithm in solving state-dependent optimal portfolio selection problems.
Example B. We consider an expected utility maximization problem in which the state-
dependence arises from making the (Arrow-Pratt) risk aversion coefficient a function of a
benchmark. It appears indeed intuitive that investors are more risk averse in bear markets
than in bull markets; see e.g., Dong & Sircar (2014), who let the risk aversion coefficient
29































numerical solution, A = 96.3
numerical solution, A = 105
exact solution, A = 96.3
exact solution, A = 105
Figure 7: Merton example with u(a, x) = 2
√
ax.
depend on the value of the portfolio itself. As for the choice of utility function, we use the
CRRA utility, and the optimization problem then reads as
max
c(XT)=W0
E [u(A, XT)] , u(a, x) =
x1−η(a)
1− η(a) , η(a) = 2 + 22 exp(−0.025a).
Observe that the risk aversion coefficient η(a) is decreasing in a, i.e., when the benchmark
(which can be seen as an indicator of the strength of the economy) is high, the risk aver-
sion coefficient is small. It decreases from 24 (when the benchmark value is close to 0) to
2 (when it goes to infinity). Using pathwise optimization we find that the theoretical solu-




η(A) , in which θ follows from
the budget constraint. Figure 8 displays, for the case m = 3, the analytical and numeri-
cal solutions and contrasts them with state-independent solutions (SIP) that are obtained
using a constant level of risk aversion η(a).
We observe that when the benchmark A is high, the optimal investment X?T yields
high income, and that when A is low, less income is received. We make two additional
observations. First, we note that for small values of A, the optimal payoff is flatter than for
higher values of A. In other words, the higher the risk aversion, the flatter the payoff of
the optimal portfolio. This is intuitive, as with infinite risk aversion the optimal portfolio
of a CRRA investor consists in allocating the investor’s entire budget to the risk-free asset.
Second, we observe that as compared to the state-independent case, the use of the state-
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numerical solution, A = 81.3694, η(A) = 4.8772
numerical solution, A = 118.6491, η(A) = 3.1329
numerical solution, A = 173.0085, η(A) = 2.2911
exact solution, A = 81.3694, η(A) = 4.8772
exact solution, A = 118.6491, η(A) = 3.1329
exact solution, A = 173.0085, η(A) = 2.2911
exact SIP solution (Merton), η = 4.8772
exact SIP solution (Merton), η = 3.1329
exact SIP solution (Merton), η = 2.2911
Figure 8: Merton example with power utility u(a, x) = x
1−η(a)
1−η(a) and state-dependent risk
aversion η(a) = 2 + 22 exp(−0.025a).
dependent utility function yields an optimal investment in which terminal wealth is very
low when the benchmark is at the lowest. This feature is at odds with the belief that a more
risk averse individual would be willing to purchase more protection and therefore to use
a larger part of his budget for obtaining protection against the worst states of the market.
In fact, this is the reason why we model η(a) as a decreasing function in a; yet although
this link between risk aversion coefficient and the state of the market appears natural, the
resulting optimal behaviour of the investor is counter-intuitive and surprising.
Table 4: Standard deviation of the optimal portfolio when the utility function to optimize
is the CRRA utility with a fixed risk aversion coefficient equal to η (SIP) or with a state-
dependent risk aversion coefficient (SDP).
SIP η = 2.2911 SIP η = 3.1329 SIP η = 4.8772 SDP η(·)
20.1421 14.4206 9.0833 166.5896
The counter-intuitive behavior is also confirmed by analyzing the variances of the
payoffs. In Table 4, we show that when the state-dependent utility function is used,
the variance of the optimal payoff is larger than that of the payoff obtained in the state-
independent case.13 One should use a fixed risk aversion coefficient of η = 0.4445 in the
13In the case of state-independent preferences, there is a constant risk aversion η, and the results in Table 4
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state-independent case, to obtain the same standard deviation (namely 166.5896) as when
using the state-dependent risk aversion.
Note that the procedure described in this section can handle very general state-dependent
objectives. For instance, it can deal with the optimization of a loss averse utility function
in which the reference level is linked to a stochastic benchmark A:
max
c(XT)=W0
E [u(A, XT)] , u(a, x) =
−C1(a− x)
η1 x 6 a
C2(x− a)η2 x > a
.
Comparing with Section 3.3, we thus obtain an optimal choice problem for a loss-averse
investor with a state-dependent reference level A. The investor thus considers positive
deviations of his terminal wealth vis-à-vis the benchmark as gains and negative deviations
as losses.
4.2.2 Merton example with a CoVaR constraint
In this final section, we propose to solve an optimal portfolio problem with a state-dependent
risk constraint in order to illustrate our algorithm and to demonstrate how it can deal eas-
ily with additional state-dependent constraints. To do so, we consider the optimal invest-
ment for a company subject to a constraint on its CoVaR (systemic risk measure proposed
by Adrian & Brunnermeier (2011)). This example extends the optimization of expected
utility with a VaR constraint (i.e., the probability constraint of Basak & Shapiro (2001)) that
we considered in Section 3.2.2. Now the VaR constraint is replaced by a CoVaR constraint,
i.e., the VaR conditional on some events, such as a financial crisis (that we could model, for
instance, as the GOP being lower than its VaR at 95%, as in Bernard et al. (2015b)).
We thus consider a state-independent objective V(XT) where XT is the wealth at ma-
turity T (typically V(X) = E [u(X)]), with an additional state-dependent risk constraint





where A is the benchmark.
are obtained explicitly. Indeed, recall that for the CRRA utility, the optimal wealth obtained with an initial
budget W0 is given by
X?T = W0e








from which it follows that Var(X?T) = W
2
0 e
2MT−(1− 2η )VT (e
1
η2
VT − 1). In the case of state-dependent preferences
– that is, a varying risk aversion η(·) – the results in Table 4 are obtained numerically.
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As a specific example of a CoVaR constraint as it has been discussed in the literature,
take sq := F−1S?T (q) the q-quantile of S
?
T (0 < q < 1) and let the event Γq = {S?T < sq}
represent a stressed situation. As benchmark we take A = 1Γq , i.e., A is the indicator
of being in stress, that is, it takes m = 2 values, namely a1 = 0 (no stress) and a2 = 1
(stress). The corresponding probabilities are then p1 = P[A = a1] = 1 − q and p2 =
P[A = a2] = P[S?T < sq] = q. Let us denote W j = W(aj) and αj = α(aj). For floor values
of the benchmark we consider (W1, W2) = (0, W), and for the probabilities we consider
(α1, α2) = (1, α) so that there is effectively only one constraint (which will be active in a
stress situation), i.e., P(XT > W2 | A = a2) = P(XT > W | Γq) > 1− α1 = 1− α. As for




with CRRA utility function uη , as given





We apply Algorithm PA-SDP to solve this optimization problem numerically. First, we
consider a risk aversion coefficient equal to η = 0.5, a floor value W = 95 and a probability
level 1− α = 0.9 corresponding to the stress situation defined by Γ0.125 = {S?T < 0.91007}.
The stress level is taken as its 12.5% quantile (which is typically much higher than the
level recommended by regulators). This level facilitates the visualization of the constraint,
as can be seen from the results shown in Figure 9(a). Next, we change the risk aversion
level to η = 2 and present the results in Figure 9(b).
We observe two parts in the optimal portfolio decisions, depending on whether we
are in a stressed scenario (corresponding to the GOP being above or below s = 0.91007,
which is its 12.5% quantile). The state-independent (Merton) solution violates the CoVaR
constraint. This can be seen from Figure 9, but is also numerically computed in Table 5.
Recall that the CoVaR constraint is only active during stress, in which case the payoff
should be above W = 95, with probability equal to 0.9. However, for a risk aversion
coefficient η = 0.5, resp. η = 2 the Merton solution (SIP) has a probability equal to 0 resp.
0.2562 to remain above 95 in the stressed scenario. Our routine constructs a solution (SDP)
that has a probability 0.9016, resp. 0.9109, to be above 95, which is compliant with the
required level 1− α = 0.9.
To remedy the CoVaR violation of the Merton solution, we observe that in the stressed
situation more insurance (consumption) will be purchased so that the desired protection
is obtained. The more risk averse, the less extra insurance is needed to shift to the stressed
situation. This result, in turn, is then compensated by a larger deviation of the payoff with
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numerical, A = 0
numerical, A = 1
W = 95
Merton solution, η =0.5
(a) η = 0.5











































numerical, A = 0
numerical, A = 1
W = 95
Merton solution, η =2
(b) η = 2
Figure 9: CRRA utility with CoVaR constraint.
respect to the Merton solution; see Figure 9.
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Table 5: CoVaR value P (XT > W(A) | A).
SDP η = 0.5 SIP η = 0.5 SDP η = 2 SIP η = 2
no stress (A = 0) 0.6453 0.7125 0.9094 1
stress (A = 1) 0.9016 0 0.9109 0.2562
5 Conclusions
Since the 1980s, it has been known that the payoff that generates a given distribution of
terminal wealth at lowest possible cost must be increasing in the market asset (see Dybvig
(1988), Bernard et al. (2014a) and Carlier & Dana (2011)). However, this characterization
of optimal payoffs has received little attention in the analysis and construction of solu-
tions to optimal portfolio problems. In this paper, we exploit this monotonicity property
to construct an efficient numerical method that makes it possible to first obtain optimal
portfolios for a wide range of problems with law-invariant objectives, and then to extend
these problems to include the case of state-dependent preferences and of additional risk
constraints.
We apply our method to various classic (non-)expected utility problems for which ex-
plicit solutions are available, and we show that the numerical solutions are compatible
with them. This observation allows us to conclude that we can use the algorithm to deal
with portfolio optimization problems for which explicit solutions are not available. Nu-
merical examples were implemented in a Black-Scholes setting but more general market
models can also be considered, such as Lévy markets with agents using Esscher pricing to
value payoffs (Von Hammerstein et al. (2014), Rüschendorf & Wolf (2015)).
We foresee a large number of additional applications of the algorithm developed in
this paper, and we sketch a few of these. For instance, Tepla (2001) and Basak et al. (2006)
explicitly derive optimal investment policies under minimum performance constraints in
a Black-Scholes market setup. The algorithm that we propose makes it possible to extend
these results to more general markets and to additional risk constraints. We may also
extend the work of Cvitanić et al. (2003) to non-expected utility settings. There are, more-
over, additional applications to insurance and pension fund allocation (see e.g., Cairns
et al. (2006) or Deelstra et al. (2003)). Finally, in the literature, equilibrium problems have
been studied in a law invariant setting (Lioui & Poncet (2001), Basak & Shapiro (2001)), but
there are almost no studies dealing with equilibrium when agents have state-dependent
preferences. We believe that our results are useful in studying such problems.
35
Acknowledgment
C. Bernard gratefully acknowledges support from the project on Systemic Risk funded by
the GRI in financial services, the Louis Bachelier Institute, and from the Odysseus research
grant funded by Flanders Research Foundation. R. H. De Staelen acknowledges the sup-
port of the Flanders Research Foundation (FWO15/PDO/076). S. Vanduffel acknowledges
the financial support of the Stewardship of Finance Chair and of the Flanders Research
Foundation.
References
Adrian, T., & Brunnermeier, M. K. (2011). CoVaR. Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Re-
search.
Allais, M. (1953). Le Comportement de l’Homme Rationnel Devant le Risque: Critique des Axiomes
et Postulats de l’école Américaine. Econometrica, 21(4), 503–546.
Basak, S., & Shapiro, A. (2001). Value-at-risk-based risk management: optimal policies and asset
prices. Review of Financial studies, 14(2), 371–405.
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